Demise of the Supercarrier

Mike Burleson

In recent wargames off their coastline, the Iranians have introduced to the world an as yet unsubstantiated new weapon called the “Hoot”, which they claim is a super torpedo. Apparently it is based on the Russian Shkval rocket, a very real weapon using super-cavitating technology which enables it to race underwater at over 200 knots. Though the Iranians are famous for boasting and outright lying, especially about her nuclear program, the proven existence of such technology means she must be taken seriously.

Commander Fred Levin of the US Navy’s Postgraduate School has stated: “Fitted with a nuclear warhead, Shkval could obliterate entire US naval battle groups and abruptly blow a hole in the USA’s carrier based air superiority doctrine”.

The Washington Times is also reporting the leaking to the Chinese of a weakness in the design of our most modern carriers. Due to the carelessness of a US Naval officer, the Red Navy now knows how to sink a carrier by using Russian made wake homing torpedoes. The Chinese are deeply bitter over US Navy incursions in the Taiwan Straits during the crisis of 1996, and apparently want to prevent another in the future.

There are three main reasons for the increased obsolescence of the modern supercarrier in Western navies. First is its immense cost, causing only a handful of very rich countries the ability to support their construction. Next, smaller and more affordable weapon systems are currently being deployed which can perform many of the functions of the carrier. Finally, and most crucial for the fate of the West, is the giant vessel’s vulnerability to modern precision weapons in the Digital Age.

We need return only to 1982, to the British/Argentine War in the Falklands to garner proof of the vulnerability of surface warships to modern weapons. In the only major air and sea battle of the Missile Age, Argentina possessed 5 Exocet cruise missiles, plus a few hundred elderly fighter bombers equipped with conventional “dumb bombs”. The Royal Navy, one of the world’s major seapowers with 3 small carriers, nuclear subs, plus anti-aircraft and anti-missile armed ships, still managed to lose 6 destroyers and frigates to the Exocets and to bombs which often failed to explode. Had the Argies acquired more cruise missiles, or if their bombers had been equipped with the new precision munitions (PGMs) just entering service, the outcome of the war would doubtless have been much different.

American naval strategists often point to Britain’s lack of large carriers in the Falklands to justify the big ships’ existence. Supercarriers posses large air wings with interceptors and early warning aircraft which would have checked any Argentine strike on the fleet, they say. Attacks by Kamikaze planes on US aircraft carriers during World War 2 seem to disprove this myth, as some attackers will always get through despite the strength of the defense. Modern cruise missiles, such as the Russian Sunburn are faster and carry vastly greater explosive power than the French made Exocet. A leading defense expert once warned Congress of this fearsome weapon, “The US Navy has nothing that can stop it.”

Laser guided bombs and long-range cruise missiles which made their debut in the 1991 Gulf War, have compounded the vulnerability of the supercarrier. Highly accurate PGMs riding a laser beam to its target could destroy it in a single strike, when once an entire air wing was needed for the same mission. The Tomahawk cruise missile with terrain following radar finally gave surface warships and submarines the ability to conduct overland strikes, once the sole prerogative of the flattops. Later the Kosovo War of 1999 saw the introduction of self-guiding JDAM bombs, which led to the first major conflict decided by airpower alone.

One mission the supercarrier advocates firmly lay claim to is the close support of ground troops. Since the Korean War of 1950-53, to Vietnam and the Gulf Wars, this excuse has been used on countless occasions to justify increasingly expensive carrier programs. In these operations, the vessels are called on to remain near to shore for their gas guzzling warplanes to assist in the land battle. During World War 2, the large carriers avoided extended stays near land based airpower as much as possible, preferring to delegate this dangerous duty to cheap and expendable escort carriers. In this age of super-stealthy diesel subs, Shkval torpedoes, mines, and super-sonic cruise missiles, continued dependence on supercarriers for close support is suicidal for ship and crew.

What may finally sound the death-knell of the supercarrier is its exorbitant price. At $8 billion each, American built vessels cost as much as many smaller nations entire defense budget. For Britain to construct 2 similar warships, due within the next decade, she has drastically reduced her surface fleet from 50 in the early 1990’s to 23 today. The US Navy is struggling as well with ship numbers, presently at 289 and predicted by many to fall even lower if not checked.

The same weaponry: missiles and guided bombs which are forcing obsolescence on the large deck carrier, is also replacing its mission at sea. Army and Marine troops regularly deploy MLRS rocket launchers and soon will carry guided artillery to war. As noted earlier, Navy cruisers, destroyers, and submarines regularly carry Tomahawk cruise missiles which can reach distances of 400 miles and more. The Air Force has been in the close support business from the start and now performs this mission with her long-range bombers which fly from bases in the US, and have no need for vulnerable off-shore platforms.

Britain’s excellent Harrier jump jet has allowed almost any vessel to become an aircraft carrier in a pinch. During the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, two helicopter carriers, after unloading their cargo of troops, were reloaded with up to 20 Harriers each, supplying the Marines with their own air support. The Navy has also experimented with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at sea fired from converted cruise missile submarines of the Ohio class. These ex-Trident ballistic missile ships have been rearmed with 154 Tomahawks, further increasing the fleet’s “giant missile magazine”.

Some have declared if the giant supercarrier is obsolete, with her numerous water-tight compartments and armored hull, then all warships must be vulnerable to emerging technologies. This same argument was once used before Pearl Harbor to justify ever larger and pricey new battleships. Just as new weapons are placing the big ships at risk, they are also forcing change on an often resistant military. Radical new hull designs are being planned and built, from the new Sea Fighter catamaran to the trimaran version of the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS). Eventually we may see many different vessels in service performing the old mission of the supercarrier, rather than the one vulnerable and increasingly unaffordable platform.

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Mike Burleson is a regular columnist with Sea Classics magazine and an advocate of Military Reform. He resides in historic Charleston, SC.

charbookguy@myway.com