An All-Helicopter Army

Mike Burleson

One of the current problems of Industrial Age Warfare is a greatly extended supply chain. The so-called Combined Arms strategy the US Army has conducted for generations with tanks, artillery, infantry, and aircraft consume vast amounts of spare parts and increasingly expensive petroleum, especially in wartime. For example, the powerful military force used to defeat Saddam Hussein in 1991 required 6 months of shipping and constant aerial supply before the liberation of Kuwait could begin. Even then, the Army possessed less than a 6-day supply of fuel to conduct the land battle. Thus, the often maligned 100 Hour War was not simply a political decision but a military necessity.

One weapon currently in the US arsenal, which could perform all the duties of the combined arms, while conducting its own resupply, is the helicopter. Such a role for Army choppers was foreseen early in the 1960’s, when the Howze Board recommended up to 6 helicopter assault divisions to give infantry an amazing new mobility. The failure of this strategy to come about completely was not for any fault in the concept, but the outcome of the war in Vietnam. That lost cause actually bore out the vision of the Howze Board, that the helicopter could perform many of the duties then carried out by armored vehicles, provide its own air support, ferry troops faster and farther than land vehicles, and resupply isolated bases in rough terrain.

When the Army withdrew from Southeast Asia in the early 1970’s, the air assault concept was mostly forgotten. Rather than emphasizing worldwide mobility, the military returned to a more static role of guarding the Western Front in Europe from Soviet aggression.

The need for a more agile military remained, however. Increased tension in the Middle East, first from Iranian Revolutionaries and then with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, proved that some sort of Rapid Deployment Force may be required. Neglect of the helicopter arm gave us the embarrassing Desert One episode, a failed attempt to rescue American Embassy hostages.

By the 1980’s America possessed only one air assault division, the 101st. With the dawning of the War on Terror in 2001, plans are to dissolve this last byproduct of the Howze Board into lighter combat brigades. With the need for agility to respond to world crises as great as ever, and logistical costs weighing on readiness and manpower needs, a renewed emphasis on heliborne forces would solve many problems.

Currently, the Army’s 5000 or so helicopters are scattered throughout the service, much like the tank was divided amongst the infantry before the hard-won lessons of World War 2. The 450 choppers the 101st once possessed were forced to make several “hops” during combat situations to place its troops into position. A new Helicopter Brigade, with 1/3 the manpower, could utilize the same number of aircraft that could move the bulk of its fighting power all at once. Armored cars and Humvees would still be needed to protect bases and for anti-insurgent duties, but the entire fighting power of the HB would be in its helicopters. Tried and true planes would be used, such as the venerable Blackhawk purchased off the shelf, plus Apaches, Cobras, and Air Force gunships for air support.

Mobility would be enhanced by operating the HB from Navy aircraft carriers. Such a concept was proven when US Army troops were ferried on the carrier USS EISENHOWER in the invasion of Haiti in 1994. Currently, US Marines utilize their own helicopter carriers, making them the world’s preeminent quick reaction force. New light carriers could be built specifically to ferry the HB, placing them near potential hotspots throughout the world, prepared for any emergencies.

Helicopters are, of course, vulnerable to enemy ground fire and small surface to air missiles. This weakness has been proven in almost every war since their creation, from Korea, to Vietnam, Afghanistan in the 1980’s, and Iraq today. On the other hand, almost every weapon currently in the US arsenal is vulnerable to some degree, including the mighty M-1 Abrams battle tank.

One weapon the chopper is invulnerable to is the IED, which has proven so troublesome to our soldiers in recent years. It can also use its unmatched mobility to bypass potential SAM sights offloading its troops into armored cars to ferry them into battle.

The helicopter would not be a perfect replacement for the tank. Given its susceptibility to ground fire, neither is it a perfect troop transport. Despite its drawbacks, the chopper has proven amazingly resilient since its introduction to warfare in World War 2. It has further given the modern military astounding agility unseen since the old Horse Cavalry of the Indian Wars. An all-helicopter army would finally give our overstretched and overworked supply chain a single system to contend with, letting the rest of the troops do what they do best: engage and defeat America’s enemies.

My blog is at newwars.blogspot.com

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Mike Burleson is a regular columnist with Sea Classics magazine and an advocate of Military Reform. He resides in historic Charleston, SC. http://tv.groups.yahoo.com/group/honestnews/ http://newwars.blogspot.com/

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