Does America Need a "Gator Navy"

Mike Burleson

From an article in the National Journal titled “Future Corps” there is this shocking statement concerning the minuscule amount of troops able to be ferried by our fleet of assault ships (helicopter carriers) and landing ships (LPDs, LSDs):

"The Navy, meanwhile, has gone from having enough amphibious assault
ships to deploy three Marine brigades simultaneously--a fraction of the force at
Inchon or Iwo Jima--to not quite enough to carry two. Two brigades happened to
be the size of the Marine feint during the Gulf War.” You could not stage an
amphibious invasion of Iran. You couldn't stage an amphibious invasion of North
Korea," said Baker, the former naval intelligence analyst. "God knows, you can't
invade China."


Only 2 brigades, or about 5000 troops out of almost 200,000! It is obvious that in no way could we stage a major amphibious assault on the scale of World War, which is what this magnificent fleet of warships was designed to perform. This current number is far smaller than the British landing forces (11,000) that retook the tiny Falkland Islands.

The 1982 British Invasion of the Falkland Islands holds many lessons for modern seapower, not the least of which is the seizing, securing, and holding of a defended beachhead. The fact that the Royal Navy, Army, and Marines succeeded in this very difficult endeavor doesn't alter our conclusion, that the World War 2 style of amphibious operations is obsolete. The few cruise missiles which the Argentine defenders possessed wrought havoc among the assembled vessels of the Royal Navy at San Carlos, not to mention the threat the new weapons posed to the British aircraft carriers which would provide essential naval air cover. The two flattops Hermes and Invincible were forced to sail at the extreme range of Argentine airpower, thus minimizing the combat radius of the defending Harrier vertol jets.

Old style "dumb bombs" also nearly defeated the assault. Fortunately most of the Argentinean pilots dropped their bombs at too low an altitude, causing comparatively little damage than what might have occurred. The few effective airstrikes occurred when the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor ferrying supplies and helicopters for the landing forces was lost after being struck by two Exocet missiles.

Here is where the "What Ifs" of history comes into play to doom the modern amphibious landing. What if the Argentines possessed a large supply of cruise missiles, as they are so prolific today? What if the British Task Force had to contend not with "dumb bombs" but modern laser guided and even newer fire-and-forget JDAM weapons currently in widespread service with US forces and her allies? Can there can be any doubt the Royal Navy amphibious forces that barely succeeded in getting the troops ashore in the face of strenuous political and military factors would have failed completely without a major change in tactics?

The United States possesses a similar force as the British save in the size of and quantity of vessels. Except for the new helicopter carriers, which is a major increase in capability, plus fast hovercraft replacing slower landing craft, the US Marines follow basically the same tactics as their forbearers in World War 2. The Navy justifies the continued existence of such expensive and vulnerable warships on the success of numerous bushfire wars during the Cold War, and ongoing into the current War on Terror. With the exception of the Inchon Landings in 1950, occurring previous to the Missile Age, America has yet to launch a single major amphibious landing on a defended beach. Without exception the enemies she has faced during this time period have been Third World foes who had little in the way of sea forces and in which the USN had unchallenged air superiority.

It is difficult to understand why even in this very desirable environment the opportunity wasn't taken to test our superior and extremely costly amphibious fleet on any occasion. We don't think this is a matter of timidity on the part of our warriors (My Gosh! These are US Marines!). Perhaps, though, it is an acknowledgement by our naval leadership of the vulnerability of this strategy in modern high-tech warfare.

Mind you, I'm not suggesting an end to the US Marines Corps, just that we need to reevaluate what role the historic service must play in our country's national security. Currently, the 189,000 strong force isn't quite a land army, and far from naval infantry. I personally feel the nation would be better served with the Corps returning to its roots, that of a light infantry maritime intervention force.

We have, then, this magnificent and greatly underutilized Gator Navy. Oh, we might be assured of the advantage such a capability gives us for disaster relief operations, showing the flag, or humanitarian missions, but couldn't such important but sundry duties be performed as effectively and at far less a cost for our stretched-thin shipbuilding budget by Navy frigates, gun boats, or hospital ships? Warships are built to fight and if they can't perform this essential function for our country then all else is useless.

My new email is charwriter2000@yahoo.com

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Mike Burleson is a regular columnist with Sea Classics magazine and an advocate of Military Reform. He resides in historic Charleston, SC. http://tv.groups.yahoo.com/group/honestnews/ http://newwars.blogspot.com/

charbookguy@myway.com